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I N ONE SENSE it may appear quite futile to revisit the now notorious
case of Ellis v. McCoy.' Nothing that is said or written at this time
can change or alter the course of events or the result that has been
achieved. Whatever the facts, whatever the demands of justice, the McCoy
child will apparently remain in the state of Florida in the care of Melvin
B. Ellis and his wife, formerly of Brookline, Massachusetts, and presently
fugitives from the justice of that Commonwealth. In another sense, how-
ever, a review of the facts in the case may serve a very useful purpose.
The strange and disquieting fact is that almost from the inception of the
case, certain elements in Massachusetts and elsewhere have set out to
attack the mother of the child, the courts of the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, and the adoption laws as well, as if to suggest that all three
have contributed to some cruel and unusual form of injustice. It is with
a view to repel and expose these attacks and to vindicate the law itself
that we now examine the Ellis case.
What are the facts? Is this a case of a heartless natural mother aban-
doning her child and years later attempting to uproot her from a happy
home? Was there a perversion of justice in the Massachusetts courts?
Are the laws of that Commonwealth out of harmony with the laws of her
sister states? These and other questions that have been, or may be, asked
are best answered by an examination of the facts that have never been
hidden from the view of those who cared to examine them. The report
of material facts of the Norfolk Probate Court, and the decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Ellis v. McCoy,2
set forth the essential facts in complete detail.
*B.A., LL.B., Boston College. Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955).
2 Ibid.
In August of 1950, Marjorie McCoy,
twenty-one years of age and unmarried, dis-
covered that she was pregnant. She confided
in her mother, who, without her knowledge,
sought the advice of a Doctor Sands with
whom she was acquainted at her place of
employment. He in turn contacted a friend
of his, a Doctor Silbert, who reported that
he had "just the people" to take the ex-
pected baby. They were Melvin and Frances
Ellis,°each of whom had had a previous
marriage which ended in divorce. Mrs. Ellis
was also the first cousin of Doctor Silbert.
Doctor Sands then contacted Marjorie Mc-
Coy and her mother and, without revealing
the name or religion of the Ellises, reported
their offer to adopt the child and pay all of
the hosoital and medical expenses. Before
the child was born, the Ellises, who were of
the Jewish faith, knew that Marjorie McCoy
was of the Catholic faith. The child was
born on February 23, 1951, in a Boston
hospital. Less than two weeks later the baby
was taken from the hospital directly to the
Ellises' home, and on March 5, 1951, Mar-
jorie McCoy signed the adoption petition
produced by Doctor Sands. She was at that
time completely unaware of the identity and
background of the Ellises. On March 27,
1951, she learned for the first time that her
child was with a non-Catholic family and in
early April demanded that the child be re-
turned to her.3 It is well to note that the
mother demanded the return of her child
within one month of the child's entrance
into the Ellises' home, immediately upon
learning that .they were non-Catholic. This
fact flatly refutes two of the statements fre-
quently made by those who condemn the
mother and criticize the court. The first is
that the mother abandoned the child or was
3 Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E.2d 266, 267 (1955).
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indifferent to her welfare; and the second is
that it was only after a long period of time,
and after the Ellises had become attached
to the child, that the mother suffered a
change of heart. Such statements are simply
untrue.
On March 27, 1951, Marjorie McCoy
was advised by Attorney Strome, who pre-
pared the adoption petition for the Ellises,
that:
1. The petition would not be allowed for
at least one year.
2. That she would have no difficulty get-
ting her child back any time before the
petition had been allowed.
3. That she would have time to think
things over and change her mind.
4
With regard to the signing by Marjorie
McCoy of the petition for adoption, Judge
Reynolds of the Norfolk Probate Court
wrote:
Notwithstanding the fact that Marjorie tes-
tified that her consent was given willingly
and that no one compelled, threatened, or
coerced her to consent, I find that she con-
sented to the petition for the adoption of
her child by persons unknown to her, under
strong pressure exerted upon her by both
Doctor Sands, and her mother, Mrs.
McCoy. ,
No sooner did Marjorie McCoy learn of
the identity of the Ellises from the attorney
then representing them, than she confronted
Doctor Sands with this information. Again
quoting from the report: "The doctor apol-
ogized and promised to help her and he
agreed with her that the child should be re-
turned before the petitioners should become
attached to her. Marjorie told Doctor Sands
that she was not going to allow the child to
stay with the petitioners. Marjorie was
4 Transcript of Record, p. 359, Ellis v. McCoy,
332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955).
; Ibid.
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angry."'  Early in April of 1951, an agent
of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare visited the Ellis home. He gave
Mrs. Ellis a copy of the adoption laws and
advised her that probate judges in general
were not allowing petitions where there was
a difference in religion. Subsequently, but
still in the month of April, 1951, several
conferences were held in the office of the
Ellises' attorney, but they refused to return
the child to her mother.7 Quoting again
from the report:
The petitioners were determined not to give
the child back. Mr. Ellis said he felt he
could 'pull strings' and get the petition al-
lowed, and if he could not then he thought
of moving out of the Commonwealth to
another state where the laws were less
stringent. Attorney Strome suggested to the
petitioners that they give the child back and
not expose themselves to litigation and the
uncertainty of the new adoption statutes.
This suggestion was a cause for disturbance
on the part of the petitioners and the meet-
ing broke up on a "sour note." Attorney
Strome said he would wait for three to five
days to give the petitioners a chance to show
him how the petition could be allowed.
Strome did not believe that "strings could
be pulled." 8
Again in May of 1951, Marjorie con-
tacted Doctor Sands and on or about May
25, he telephoned the Ellises and told them
that they ought to-give the baby back to the
mother. They refused, became "abusive,"
and then terminated the conversation.9 In
the early part of June, Attorney Strome
telephoned the Ellises and told them that
unless they gave the child back to her
mother, he would withdraw from the case.
The Ellises then engaged new counsel and
6 Id. at 360.
T Id. at 361.
8 Id. at 361-62.
9 Id. at 362.
on June 26, 1951, Attorney Strome did, in
fact, withdraw from the case.10
There is perhaps no better way of closing
this factual narrative than by quoting at
some length from the report of material
facts of the Probate Judge for Norfolk
County. He found:
This is a case where the same attorney
represented both the Ellises and Marjorie
through the intermeddling of a physician.
I find and rule that Marjorie should have
been advised to seek the benefit of inde-
pendent advice and counsel long before the
time she herself sought a new lawyer in
August 1951.
After Marjorie recovered from the shock
of her pregnancy and its ensuing childbirth,
and after she learned the child was with
a Jewish family, she became conscience
stricken due to religious scruples and then
made a diligent effort to get her child placed
in the care of the Catholic Charitable Bu-
reau for the purpose of effecting an adop-
tion by a family of her own religious
persuasion.
I find and rule that upon the facts re-
ported herein the consent of Marjorie to the
petition for adoption of her child should be
nullified and withdrawn.
I find and rule that upon the facts re-
ported herein the welfare of the child will
be best served, and, of statutory importance
(See Zalis vs. Ksypka 315 Mass. 479 @
482), the spirit of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) Chapter
210, Section 5B, will be better observed if
the petition for adoption be dismissed and
the child restored to its mother for the pur-
pose of carrying out her plan to surrender
the child to the Catholic Charitable Bureau
for her adoption by a Catholic family. 1
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Judge
Reynolds allowed Marjorie McCoy's mo-
tion for leave to withdraw and revoke her
consent to the petition for adoption filed by
the Ellises, and at the same time denied the
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 364-65.
adoption petition itself. These decrees were
entered in the Norfolk Probate Court on
June 15, 1953. Refusing to abide by the de-
cision of the court, the Ellises then appealed
to the highest court in the Commonwealth,
the Supreme Judicial Court. The evidence
was reported in full to that court, and argu-
ments were heard on October 4 and 5 of
1954. On February 14, 1955, the Supreme
Judicial Court rendered its decision affirm-
ing the decrees of the Norfolk Probate
Court. In its opinion, in which all of the
justices concurred, the court said:
We think it plain that the judge had the
power to allow the respondent's, [i.e., Mar-
jorie McCoy's] motion. This is in accord
with the weight of authority elsewhere. It
is also our opinion that the findings are
sufficient to-justify its allowance as a matter
of discretion.... [A] court is "bound to give
controlling effect to identity of religious
faith 'when practicable.' "12
What has been written thus far should
dispel any erroneous notions as to the essen-
tial facts of the case. It cannot be contro-
verted that within a month from the time
her baby was taken into the Ellises' home,
and as soon as she became aware of the
facts, the natural mother protested and de-
manded the return of her baby. She has
never ceased protesting. The Ellises, how-
ever, neither obeyed the decrees of the
Probate Court nor the decision of the Su-
preme Judicial Court, but used every legal
device available to them to delay the case
and thwart the wishes of the natural mother.
Finally, when all legal means had been ex-
hausted, they fled the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and have remained outside
the jurisdiction of its courts. The long period
of time that ensued between the date the
child was first demanded back from the
12 Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E.2d 266. 268 (1955).
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Ellises by her natural mother, and the final
judgment of the Supreme Court, was, as
Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston
termed it, "the result of a cleverly con-
trived, wilful and systematic avoidance and
evasion of the law." Surely in this case,
justice delayed has been justice denied.
The reader may judge for himself whether
in the light of the foregoing there was any
abandonment of the child by her natural
mother. The reader may likewise judge
whether the decree of the Probate Court of
Norfolk County, affirmed by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, was a per-
version or miscarriage of justice. The in-
quiry may still be made, however, as to
whether the adoption laws of the Common-
wealth, in placing such emphasis upon the
religious faith of the child, are out of har-
mony with the laws elsewhere. Is the Mas-
sachusetts law unique? Does it prefer one
religion to another. Let us see.
The pertinent section of the adoption
laws of the Commonwealth referred to both
in the report of material facts of the Pro-
bate Court and the opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court reads as follows:
In making orders for adoption, the judge
when practicable must give custody only to
persons of the same religious faith as that of
the child. In the event that there is a dispute
as to the religion of said child, its religion
shall be deemed to be that of its mother.
If the court, with due regard for the re-
ligion of the child, shall nevertheless grant
the petition for adoption of a child prof-
fered by a person or persons of a religious
faith or persuasion other than that of the
child, the court shall state the facts which
impelled it to make such a disposition and
such statement shall be made part of the
minutes of the proceedings.' 3
The foregoing section was enacted into
13 MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 210. §5B (1955).
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law in 1950 as a result of the report of a
special commission created by the Massa-
chusetts Legislature for the express purpose
of examining the adoption laws.14 Distin-
guished members of all of the major reli-
gious faiths in the Commonwealth served
on that commission. They had no difficulty
in finding precedent in other jurisdictions
for the recommendations that they made.
The laws of the following states urge that
the religious belief of an adoptive parent be
in conformity with either that of the child
or of the natural parents: Delaware,1 5 Illi-
nois, 16 Louisiana,17 Maryland, 8 New
York,19 Oklahoma,'2 Oregon, 2 1 Pennsyl-
vania 2 2 Rhode Island, 2 3 and Wisconsin.2 4
Moreover, at least eight other states include
similarity of religion as a factor in deter-
mining the suitability of a proposed adop-
tion.25 Furthermore, twenty-eight jurisdic-
tions require, when practicable, that the
religion of guardians or foster parents simi-
14 Laws of Mass. 1950, c. 737, §3.
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §911 (1953).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. c.4, §4-2 (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1956).
17 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §13:1581 (1951).
1S MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §76 (Supp. 1956).
19 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §3.
20 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §824 (Supp. 1956).
-21 ORE. REV. STAT. §419.132 (1955).
22 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §l(d) (Purdon, Supp.
1956).
23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c.15, §7-13 (1956).
24 WIS. STAT. ANN. §48.82(3) (West 1957).
2 5 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §4-1-7(e) (1953); Conn.
Pub. Acts 1957, No. 203; GA. CODE ANN. §74-411
(Supp. 1955); IOWA CODE ANN. §600.1 (Supp.
1956); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 461, §2 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:3-23 A(4) (Supp. 1956);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3107.05 (Baldwin 1953);
WASH. REV. CODE §26.32.090 (Supp. 1955).
larly correspond.2 1 This requirement also
applies to the placement of neglected or
delinquent children in twenty-one jurisdic-
tions.2 7
As a specific example of similar adoption
requirements, one might cite Section 3 of
the Social Welfare Law of the state of
New York which provides: "In appointing
guardians of children and in granting or-
ders of adoption of the children, the court
'
6 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §361 (1940); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §8-236 (West 1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§45-229, 221 (1947); CAL. WELFARE &
INST'NS §§551, 552 (1956); D.C. CODE ANN.
§11-918 (1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. c.23, §299b(1)
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-
3217 (Burns 1956); KY. REV. STAT. 'ANN.
§208.250 (Baldwin 1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
c.25, g252 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §260.20
(1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §210.160 (1949); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §10-510. (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. §43-216 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4C-
27 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §3;
N.C. GEN. STAT. §110-35 (1952); N.D. REV.
CODE §27-1622 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§5103.05 (Baldwin 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, §824 (Supp. 1955); ORE. REV. STAT. §419.132
(1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-7-13 (1956); S.C.
CODE §15-1416 (1952); S.D. CODE §43.0322
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §14-1415 (1955);
VT. REV. STAT. §9899 (1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§16.1-182 (Supp. 1956); W.VA. CODE ANN.
§4904(7) (1955); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §58-
610 (1945).
27 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §361 (1940); ARZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §8-236 (West 1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§45-229, 221 (1947); CAL. WELFARE &
INST'NS §§551, 552 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§16-1814(2) (Supp. 1957); IND. ANN. STAT.
§9-3217 (Burns 1956); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§208.250 (Baldwin 1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
c.25, §252 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §260.20
(1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §211.140 (1949); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §10-614 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. §43-216 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:4-37
(1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-8-55 (Supp. 1957);
N.D. REV. CODE §27-1622 (1943); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§2151.32, 5103.05 (Baldwin 1953);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §824 (Supp. 1955);
S.D. CODE §43.0322 (1939); VT. REV. STAT. §9899
(1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4904(7) (1955);
WYO. COMP. STAT. §58-610 (1945).
shall, when practicable appoint as such
guardians, and give custody through adop-
tion, only to a person or persons of the
same religious faith as that of the child."
The statutes of other jurisdictions might be
quoted here but it will suffice to say that
the law of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts is consistent with many of her sis-
ter states, and that her policy, concerning
the rearing of children apart from their
natural parents, is that of the majority.
Both before and since the passage of
Section 5B of Chapter 210 of the General
Laws of Massachusetts, the welfare of the
child was, and is, the primary and control-
lingiconsideration. The present law does
not prevent or prohibit the crossing of reli-
gious lines in "adoption cases under any and
all circumstances., The judges of the pro-
bate courts may still in their sound judici al
discretion award the child to adopting par-
ents of a religious faith other than that of
the child, provided they determine it to be
in the best interests of the child. If they do
so, however, they are required to state in
writing the facts which impelled them to
make this disposition of the child. The pro-
bate judges now, as heretofore, take into
consideration all of the facts and circum-
stances in adoption cases, such as the
economic condition of the applicants for
adoption, their reputation in the commu-
nity, their moral character, their home en-
vironment, and the wishes and desires of
the natural mother, as well as the religious
faith of the child. All that the law does, as
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts has said in more than one case, is to
-ascribe more weight than was previously
given to the religion of the natural parents
in adoption proceedings. In thus providing,
the Massachusetts Legislature did only
what a majority of state legislatures in this
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country had previously done. The Ellises
were not the victims of any unique or un-
usual laws. The real victims were the nat-
ural mother and the child. So, too, is
justice itself which has been thwarted and
perverted by wilful people who have re-
fused to abide by the law of the jurisdiction
that they themselves saw fit to invoke. The
actions of the Governor of Florida in re-
fusing to honor the request of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts for the extra-
dition of the Ellises, and of the Florida
court which permitted the adoption of the
McCoy child by the Ellises, cannot change
the essential facts one iota. Such actions
merely indicate that at times, unfortunately,
we find ourselves living under a govern-
ment of men - and not of laws.
Finally, and this point must be made be-
cause of the position taken by certain
"pressure groups" both within and without
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Sec-
tion 5B of Chapter 210 of the General
Laws in no way violates what is commonly
referred to as the principle of separation of
church and state. That contention was con-
clusively disposed of by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts in the case of
Petitions of Goldman,2s when the court,
speaking through the Chief Justice, de-
clared:
It is contended that 5B is unconstitutional
as a "law respecting ... an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," contrary to the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and
as in some manner contrary to art. 2 of our
Declaration of Rights and to art. 11 and art.
46, § 1, of the Amendments to the Consti-
28 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert.
denied sub nom. Goldman v. Fogarty, 348 U.S.
942 (1955).
(Continued on page 100)
